University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

9-25-1952

In re Bloch's Estate
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, In re Bloch's Estate 39 Cal.2d 570 (1952).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/476

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

)

[L.· A. No. 22069. In Bank.

Sept. 25, 1952.]

Estate of HELENE I. BLOCH. Deceased. SALLY GOIJDBERG, Respondent, v. JULIUS J. BLOCH, Appellant.
[1] Wills-Holographic Wills-Requisites.-A holographic will
must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator's
hand (Prob. Code, § 53), and it must be executed with testamentary intent.
[2] Id.-Holographic Wills-Position of Signature.-Signature of
testator in a holographic will need not be located at the end
but may appear in another part of the document, provided
he wrote his· name there with the intention of authenticating
or executing the instrument as his will.
[3] ld.-Holographic Wills-Position of Signature.-The fact that
testator wrote his name on holographic instrument with intent
to execute it as a will must appear on the face of the document
itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to show that a
signature found elsewhere than at the end is a signature of
execution.
[4] Id.-Holographic Wills-Position of Signature.-Where a
decedent's signature is found only in the body of a document
which is claimed to be a will, the court must determine from
an inspection of the instrument's language, form and the relative position of its parts whether or not there is a positive and
satisfactory inference that decedent's name was placed in that
location with the intention of executing the instrument, and
[1] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 179; Am.Jur., Wills, § 632 et seq.
[2] See daUur., Wills, § 184; Am.Jur., Wills, § 647.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 186; (2] Wills, § 197(1);
(3] Wills, §l97(2); [4-6] Wills, § 197(3).
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if such an inference appears, the execution is considered
proven.
[5] ld. - Holographic Wills - Position of Signature. - A holographic testamentary instrument may be admitted to probate,
although the testator wrote his name only in the beginning or
at a place other than at the end, when it appears that the
instrument is a completed declaration of decedent's desires.
[6] ld.-Holographic Wills-Position of Signature.-Where holographic instrument discloses a testamentary intent and name
of testatrix appears in body of instrument before list of bonds
which she specifics belong solely to her and are to be distributed equally among several named individuals, and where she
excludes her husband from sharing in this bequest, giving reasons for doing so, and it appears that such document is a
complete testamentary instrument, her name is to be regarded
as having been written in the body of the instrument with
authenticating intent, although she used her name to describe
the property covered by the bequest as well as to authenticate
the will.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County admitting a holographic will to probate.
John Gee Clark, Judge. Affirmed.
Frye & Yudelson and Collman E. Yudelson for Appellant.
Samuel D. Robbins for Respondent.
GIBSON, C. J.-This is an appeal from an order admitting
to probate, as the will of Helene I. Bloch, a holographic instrument which was found after her death in a safety deposit box
held by her and her sister as joint tenants. The document,
which appeared on two sides of an envelope, was dated and
was written entirely in decedent's own hand. The portions
of the writing which were admitted to probate are as follows :.
"My executor shall be Sally Goldberg (sister) who shall employ counsel & pay expenses from estate to fight any action '
which may be taken by said husband Julius J Bloch
8/24/48
8000QQ ,
Bonds belonging solely to Helene I. Bloch
530000
1330000
*Language on the envelope by which decedent attempted to provide
funds for care of her grave was denied probate, but the parties raise
no question as to this part of the order.
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111 case of my death these are to be distributed to the following childrell for tlll'il' edw'ation (divided equally)
Babette !1'reshmall
Carolyn F'reshman
Barbara Sue Freshman
Gary Lee Goldberg
Susan Linda Goldberg
Judy Brown
Stephen Brown
Julius J Bloch shall not receive a dower right or be allowed
to contest my wishes in any court in the United States.
Julius J Block did not
over [end of first side of envelope]
prior
give me any part of these monies Same was saved (before)
my marriage and invested likewise. During my marriage
Julius J Bloch did not contribute to my support-I paid my
own expenses throughout our marriage Therefore he is not
to receive one cent of my estate. During our marriage Julius
J Block, husband, was such only in name. 'When he had funds
or made profits he squandered all on his selfish desires gambling-also throughout this marriage I continually aided financially his many adventures-all ending with losses Therefore
I feel he does not participate."
The writing stopped at the lower right-hand corner of the
second side of the envelope, and there was insufficient room
at that location for any further words of the same size and
spacing as were employed elsewhere in the document. Some
unused space was left above the writing on both sides of the
envelope.
[1] A holographic will must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator (Prob. Code, § 53), and
it must be executed with testamentary intent. (Estate of
Golder, 31 Cal.2d 848, 850 [193 P.2d 465].) The language
of the document involved here is plainly dispositive in character, and the document was dated and was admittedly written
by the hand of the decedent. The sole question is whether
the decedent's name, which appears only in the body of the
instrument, constitutes a signature within the meaning of the
statute.
[2] It is settled in California that the signature need not
be located at the end but may appear in another part of the
document, provided the testator wrote his name there with
the intention of authenticating or executing the instrument
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as his will. (Estate of Kinney, 16 Ca1.2d 50, 53 [104 P.2d
782] ; Estate of McMahon, 174 Cal. 423, 424 [163 P. 669,
L.RA. 1917D 778] ; see Estate of Manchester, 174 Cal. 417,
421 [163 P. 358, Ann.Cas. 1918B 227, L.RA. 1917D
629].) [3] The required intention must appear on the face
of the document itself, and parol evidence is not admissible
to show that a signature found elsewhere than at the end is
a signature of execution. (Estate of Hurley, 178 Cal. 713,
714-715 [174 P. 669] ; see Estate of Morgan, 200 Cal. 400,
401-402 [253 P. 702] ; Estate of McMahon, 174 Cal. 423, 424
[163 P. 669, L.RA. 1917D 629] ; Estate of Manchester, 174 '
Cal. 417, 421-422 [163 P. 358, Ann. Cas. 1918B 227, L.R.A.
1917D 629] ; Estate of Kinney, 16 Cal.2d 50, 53 [104 P.2d ,
782].) The rule of evidence adopted in these cases has also
been applied in determining whether a signature appearing
in the body of a document is sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds. (Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corp., 33 Cal.2d 814,
820-821 [205 P.2d 1025] ; 'McNear v. Petroleum Export Corp., .
208 Cal. 162, 167-168 [280 P. 684] [citing probate cases].)
[4] It has been said that where a decedent's signature
is found only in the body of a document which is claimed to
be a will, the court must determine from an inspection of the
instrument's language, form and the relative position of its
parts whether or not there is a positive and satisfactory inference that the decedent's name was placed in that location
with the intention of executing the instrument, and if such
an inference appears, the execution is considered proven. (See
Estate of Kinney, 16 CaI.2d 50, 53 [104 P.2d 782] ; Estate of
Jlanchester, 174 Cal. 417, 421 [163 P. 358, Ann.Cas. 1918B
227, L.RA. 1917D 629].) [5] Particularly important here
are the principles set forth in the Kinney case where it
was held that a holographic testamentary instrument may be
admitted to probate, although the testator wrote his name
only in the beginning, whenever it appears that the instrument is a completed declaration of the decedent's desires. (16
Ca1.2d at pp. 54-56.) The court said (16 Ca1.2d at pp. 55-56) :
"Completeness alone has been held sufficient evidence of the
adoption of the name so placed as the authenticating signature
of the testator and as a compliance with the statute which
requires the will to be 'signed'. . . . From the earliest con!'Iidcration of the question, completeness of the testamentary
declaration has been deemed sufficient evidence of the 'signing'
of the writing, even though the declarant's name was written
by him at a place other than at the end." The court dis-
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tinguished cases cited for the proposition that there must be
some affirmative expression to the effect that the name was
adopted as an executing signature, and it stated that those
cases are not to be construed as holding that such an affirmative expression is. required where the will appears to be a
completed testamentary declaration. (16 Ca1.2d at p. 54.) In
this connection it was noted that the decedents involved in
those cases did not appear to have "done everything they
intended to do." (16 Ca1.2d at p. 55.) The court, applying
these principles, upheld a will which provided simply: "I
Anna Leona Graves Kinney, do bequeath all my possessions to
my four sisters who were living in 1923," giving the names
and addresses of four persons.
Many other cases, some of which have cited and followed
Estate of Kinney, indicate that the courts of this state have
been very liberal in sustaining the validity of holographic
wills which appear to be complete testamentary documents
although signed elsewhere than at the end. (See Estate of
Brooks, 214 Cal. 138, 140-141 [4 P.2d 148] ["This is my
will-Elizabeth Ryan Brooks," after which are numerous ,
specific bequests] ; Estate of Morgan, 200 Cal. 400, 402 [253
P. 702]; Estate of Wallace, 100 Ca1.App.2d 237, 239 [~23
P.2d 284], ["I, James T. Wallace have the use of all Personal
and Real Estate as long as I survive," after which were two
short sentences disposing of the property]; Estate of Gardener, 84 Cal.App.2d 394, 396-397 [190 P.2d 629], ["I, Mrs.
Estelle Gardener 433 West Laurel Street do give devise and
bequeth Mrs. Dorothy Mathews and Mrs. Eleatra Hyatt"
certain described property]; Estate of Kaminski, 45 Cal.
App.2d 779, 781-782 [115 P.2d 21], ["Last will and testament of Belle Kaminski, Dec. 8-1937 ... being of sound
and disposing mind and memory . . . do make publish and
declare this my last will & testament in the manner following,
that is to say," followed by specific provisions disposing of
property and concluding with a direction for cremation];
Estate of Bauman, 114 Cal. App. 551, 553 et seq. f300 P. 62],
["That I Lovina Bauman, on this date April 9th, 1929, desire
my wishes herein executed as stated. . . . "J; Estate of Sullivan,94 Cal.App. 674, 677 [271 P. 753], ["I, Mark Cornelius
Sullivan . . . revoking all wills by me heretofore made, do
hereby publish and declare this my Last Will and Testament
. . . in manner and form following: . . ."]; Estate. of England, 85 Ca1.App. 486, 488 [259 P. 956], ["Last Will of Anna
England," in caption, followed only by bequests].)
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[6] The instrument involved in the present case, as we
have seen, discloses a testamentary intent, and, in our opinion,
constitutes a complete testamentary document under the foregoing decisions. The writing, on its face, indicates that the
testatrix did everything that she intended to do: She specified that the bonds which belonged solely to her were to
be distributed equally among seven named individuals; she
excluded her husband from sharing in this bequest, giving
reasons for doing so; and she appointed her sister executrix and directed her to resist any action which might be
taken by the husband. The document, after giving the reasons of the testatrix for exclusion of her husband, ends, in
a natural manner, by stating: "Therefore I feel he does
not participate.' '. The photostat of the instrument contained in the clerk's transcript shows that after the word
"participate" there is a mark which, although not entirely
clear, may well have been intended as a period. Even if
no period was placed at the end, other portions of the writing disclose that the testatrix occasionally omitted punctuation marks after sentences and initials. (See Estate of Brooks,
214 Cal. 138, 140 [4 P.2d 148], sustaining will with neither
period nor signature at end.) The fact that the testatrix
used her name in one part of the document for a dual purpose, that is, to describe the property covered by the bequest
as well as to authenticate the will, is immaterial.
Unlike the writings involved in the cases relied upon by
appellant, there is nothing in the document before us to
suggest that it was incomplete in the sense that the testatrix
may have intended to set forth any additional matter but
failed to do so. For example, the instrument considered in
Estate of :f,!anchester, 174 Cal. 417 [163 P. 358, Ann.Cas.
1918B 227, L.R.A. 1917D 629], ended: "Whereunto I hereby
set my hand this fourteenth day of January, 1914," and
the court stated that these are apt words to precede a signature in attestation of a will and tend to show that the
decedent intended to sign immediately below but did not
carry out that intent. (174 Cal. at p. 419.) In Estate of
*The parties, in their briefs, disagree as to whether the last word
is "participate" or an abbreviation thereof or something else. The
dispute is apparently due to the fact that the briefs contain photo·
stats which are not as clear as the one in the clerk's transcript, which
plainly shows each letter of the word. It is possible that the testatrix
inserted the provision relating to her "executor" after she had written
the above quoted sentence, but this does not seem to be material Bince
each provision is complete by itself.
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Bernat'd, 197 Cal. 36, 40-41 [239 P. 404], the court held that
the abrupt termination of the instrument near the middle of
the last page manifested that the writer did not intend to
stop at that point but, rather, that something additional was
to be done, and that this compelled the conclusion that the
decedent had no intention of adopting the name written in
the opening clause as the executing signature of a will. (See,
also, Estate of Leonard, 1 Cal.2d 8, 9 et seq. [32 P.2d 603) ;
Estate of Devlin, 198 Cal. 721, 726 [247 P. 577] ; Estate of
Hurley, 178 Cal. 713, 715 [174 P. 669].)
Since it appears that the holographic document written
by Mrs. Bloch is a complete testamentary instrument, it follows, under the decision in Estate of Kinney, sttpra, 16 Cal.
2d 50, 56, that her name is to be regarded as having been
written in the body of the instrument with authenticating
intent.
The order is affirmed.

Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
In my opinion the decedent did not comply with the re- .
quirement of section 53 of the Probate Code that a holographic
will must be "signed by the hand of the testator himself."
Although this section does not require the signature to be
affixed at the end of the instrument offered for probate
(compare § 50(1)), it does require the name of the decedent,
wherever placed, to be written with the intention of executing
the instrument as a will. (Estate of llianchester, 174 Cal.
417, 421 [163 P. 358, Ann.Cas. 1918B 227, L.R.A. 1917D
629] ; see cases collected in 19 A.L.R.2d 926.)
Regardless of where the name may appear in the instrument, there is always the possibility, of course, that it was .
intended as a signature. The mere existence of that possi- .
bility, however, is not enough to permit a reasonable inference that it was so intended. When the name is used to
identify the decedent as the author of the alleged will as
in Estate of Kinney, 16 CaL2d 50 [104 P.2d 782] ("I Anna
Leona Graves Kinney, do bequeath all my possessions to my
four sisters")' or to identify the instrument as decedent's
will as in Estate of Brooks, 214 Cal. 138 [4 P.2d 148] ("This
is my will-Elizabeth Ryan Brooks"), and in addition the
instrument appears to be a complete testamentary document,
it may reasonably be inferred that the name was placed where
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it was with thc intention of cxecuting the instrument. In
such cases the namc is linked to the alleged testamentary act
and the probabilities that it was intended as a signature
are strong. In the lUI'sent case, on the contrary, decedent's
name appears only in the description of her property. It
is not part of the description of the instrument itself or of
the purpose for which it was written. The holding that under
such circumstances the mere fact that the alleged will appears to be a complete testamentary instrument is evidence
that it was signed, confuses the question whether it was intended as a will with the question whether the name appearing thereon was intended as a signature. As this court
pointed out in Marks v. Walter G. McOarty Oorp., 33 Cal.
2d 814, 820 [205 P.2d 1025], quoting Chief Judge Cardozo
in Mesibov, Glinert & Levy v. Oohen Bros. Mfg. 00.,245 N.Y.
305, 311-312 [157 N.E. 148], " 'We may, indeed, infer from
the delivery of the writing that the defendant intended to
assume the obligation of a contract, whether the document
was signed or unsigned. It might have intended as much
if there had been no writing whatever. It may even have
supposed that a writing was unnecessary. Something more
must be found before the statutory requirements can be held
to be obeyed. The defendant must have intended not merely
to contract, but to sign. ,\Ve see no mark of such purpose.' "
No inference was drawn in the Marks case that defendant's
name was intended as a signature from the fact that it appeared at the head of a complete instrument. Similarly, in
this case the words "Bonds belonging solely to Helene B.
Bloch" provide no evidence that decedent placed her name
in the body of the instrument with the intent that it operate as an executing signature, and, accordingly, it is immaterial that the instrument may otherwise appear to be
a complete testamentary act.
"[T]he right to make testamentary disposition of property
is not an inherent right or a right of citizenship, nor is
it even a right granted by the constitution. It rests wholly
upon the legislative will, and is derived entirely from the
statutes. In conferring that right the legislature has seen
fit to prescribe certain exactions and requirements looking
to the execution and authentication of the instrument, and
a compliance with thesc requirements becomes necessary to
its exercise. " (In re Walker, 110 Cal. 387, 390 [42 P. 815,
52 Am.St.Rep. 104, 30 L.R.A. 460].) It is the duty of a
3l/ C.2d-li
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